Unity of Action in a Latin Social Model of the Trinity by Williams, Scott M.
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 34 Issue 3 Article 4 
7-1-2017 
Unity of Action in a Latin Social Model of the Trinity 
Scott M. Williams 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Williams, Scott M. (2017) "Unity of Action in a Latin Social Model of the Trinity," Faith and Philosophy: 
Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 34 : Iss. 3 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol34/iss3/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
UNITY OF ACTION IN A  
LATIN SOCIAL MODEL OF THE TRINITY
Scott M. Williams
I develop a Latin Social model of the Trinity that is an extension of my previ-
ous work on indexicals and the Trinity. I focus on the theological desideratum 
of the necessity of the divine persons’ unity of action. After giving my ac-
count of this unity, I compare my account with Swinburne’s and Hasker’s 
social models and Leftow’s non-social model. I argue that their accounts of 
the divine persons’ unity of action are theologically unsatisfactory and that 
this unsatisfactoriness derives from a modern conception of personhood  
according to which distinct and incommunicable intellectual acts and voli-
tional acts are necessary conditions for one’s being a person. I argue that the 
Latin Social model is preferable to the modern-personhood models because 
it is simpler in explanatory economy with regard to securing the necessity of 
the divine persons’ unity of action.
1. Introduction
Christians traditionally believe that the world is contingent. God could 
have chosen otherwise than God did in creating this world. In choosing 
to create this world, God chose that, e.g., the Earth revolve around the 
sun in the direction it actually does. God could have chosen that the Earth 
revolve around the sun in a different direction. This choice is arbitrary; 
there is no overriding reason why God made this particular choice. Call 
such cases cases of “permissible alternatives.” Each option is morally per-
missible in the sense that God’s choosing a direction of revolution and not 
another direction of revolution is not morally better or worse. Christians 
also traditionally believe that the divine persons are necessarily unified or 
necessarily agree regarding all things, including permissible alternatives. 
They cannot fail to be unified and agree. Call this the “necessary agree-
ment” thesis [ = NA].
Orthodox Christians have several reasons for affirming NA. Respected 
Christian theologians have taken pains to distinguish Trinitarianism from 
Tri-theism, or polytheism. One difference between these views is sup-
posed to be that the former, and not the latter, endorses NA.1 Arguments 
for God’s existence typically aim for a conclusion that there is just one 
1See McCall and Rea, “Introduction,” 6.
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ultimate source for all created existing things, and not three separate or 
independent ultimate sources that just so happen to agree on creating this 
particular world.2 Further, for many orthodox Trinitarians, there is a desire 
to show how a doctrine of the Trinity is consistent with, or a completion 
of, Jewish monotheism.3 It is difficult to see how a model of the Trinity is 
consistent with Jewish monotheism if it were not also consistent with NA.
Some social models of the Trinity explain the divine persons’ unity of 
action regarding permissible alternatives by saying that the divine per-
sons agree on a moral reason or rule for deciding what to will.4 The divine 
persons agreeing on some moral reason or rule would determine which 
option would be chosen if one were chosen. Richard Swinburne’s social 
model and (to some extent) William Hasker’s social model are examples 
of using this strategy for securing NA.5
I find appeals to an agreed upon moral reason or rule for such cases 
to be theologically and philosophically unsatisfying. It is better to say 
that the divine persons share numerically one will and that they just will 
something with regard to permissible alternatives. On this view the divine 
persons’ unity of action is a metaphysically necessary agreement and not 
a voluntary moral agreement. If the divine persons’ unity of action in such 
cases can be explained on a metaphysical basis, then it is unnecessary to 
posit an additional voluntary moral agreement about how to decide what 
is to be willed regarding permissible alternatives. Although Swinburne’s 
and Hasker’s social models are the main target, Brian Leftow’s non-social 
model is open to the same criticism.
In what follows I develop a model of the Trinity, which I call a Latin 
Social model, that secures NA on a metaphysical basis by employing 
Richard of St. Victor’s concept of personhood, a distinction between mental 
tokens and propositions to which they refer, and an externalist account of 
the essential indexical “I.” Further, I argue that there is a common source 
for Swinburne’s, Hasker’s, and Leftow’s models of the Trinity being open 
to the criticism that they insufficiently secure NA, namely their “modern” 
or Lockean conceptions of a divine person according to which distinct and 
incommunicable intellectual acts and volitional acts are necessary condi-
tions for one to be a certain divine person.
2. Notional and Essential Acts, and Theological Authorities
From an orthodox Christian point of view, it is right to believe that the 
divine persons have a unity of action except with regard to the activities 
or relations that distinguish them as divine persons.6 The Father’s beget-
2See Swinburne, Is There a God?, 40–43.
3See discussion in Leftow, “Anti Social Trinitarianism,” 235–241.
4For discussion, see McCall and Rea, “Introduction,” 4–5.
5Cf. Swinburne, The Christian God, 172–176, and Hasker, The Metaphysics of the Tri-Personal 
God, 208–209.
6Cf. Coakley, “‘Persons’ in the ‘Social’ Doctrine of the Trinity,” 123–144, esp. 137. 
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ting the Son, the Son’s being begotten, and the Holy Spirit’s being spirated are 
the activities or relations that distinguish the persons. (I am not concerned 
here with a fine-grained analysis of these—whether they are actions or just 
relations.) These activities or relations are traditionally called “notional 
acts.” The divine persons’ activities that are unified are called “essential 
acts.” Essential acts include acts of intellect and acts of will. It is common 
to find within the history of Christian theology the claim that, e.g., the 
Father’s (essential) act of loving X, the Son’s (essential) act of loving X, and 
the Holy Spirit’s (essential) act of loving X, are numerically the same or 
identically the same (essential) act of loving X.7 The same goes for an essen-
tial act of understanding X.8 Sometimes theologians have inferred from the 
divine persons’ (numerically) same divine nature or essence to the persons’ 
(numerically) same divine will. But sometimes the explanatory order is 
the reverse: if the divine persons share (numerically) the same divine will, 
then they share (numerically) the same divine nature or essence.9 In one 
passage, quoted by Michel Barnes, Gregory of Nyssa could be interpreted 
as committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent, but another inter-
pretation—one that I think is more likely given other things that Gregory 
says—is that he is positing a biconditional: if there is unity of divine nature 
or essence, then there is unity of will, and, if there is unity of will, then 
there is unity of divine nature or essence.
For the community of nature gives us warrant that the will of the Father, of 
the Son, and of the Holy Spirit is one, and thus, if the Holy Spirit wills that 
which seems good to the Son, the community of will clearly points to unity 
of essence.10
In another text Gregory of Nyssa declares that
No postponement occurs, or is thought of, in the movement from the divine 
will from the Father through the Son to the Spirit. But deity is one of the 
7See Hugh of St. Victor, Quaestiones et Decisiones in Epistolas D. Pauli: In Epistolam ad 
Romanos, Quaestio 286. For discussion of Thomas Aquinas on “essential acts” and references, 
see Emery, The Trinitarian Theology of Thomas Aquinas, 74–75. Also, for coverage of scholastic 
theologians see Friedman, Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University, 275–279, 412–415, 
458–460, 465–467, 590–591. Also, Cross, Duns Scotus on God, 223–232. See quotations from 
Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus below too. For discussion of John of Damascus 
on the divine persons’ unity of substance and action, see Twombly, Perichoresis and Person-
hood, 31–46.
8The medieval doctrine of appropriation reflects this quite forcefully. See Emery, The 
Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, 312–337, esp. 337: “Appropriation is concerned 
exclusively with the region of that which is absolutely common to the three persons, that is 
to say, with that which is ‘attributed to the nature.’” For example, Richard of St. Victor, De 
Trinitate, 247, line 4–248, line 54, appropriates power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and 
goodness to the Holy Spirit.
9See Augustine, De Trinitate, 245, line 56–247, line 111, 476, lines 45–48, and 502, lines 
28–53. See Gregory of Nyssa, “Concerning We Should Think of Saying That These are Not 
Three Gods to Ablabius,” 157. For discussion see Barnes, “Divine Unity and the Divided 
Self,” 489–490.
10Barnes, “Divine Unity and the Divided Self,” 489.
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good names and thoughts, and not reasonably is the name to be used in the 
plural, since the unity of activity prevents a plural counting.11
From this it is evident that Gregory of Nyssa maintains that there is (nu-
merically) one divine will and the divine persons share (numerically) 
the same divine volitions. We find the same claim made by Gregory of 
Nazianzus, as reported by Barnes:
Gregory of Nazianzus is perhaps even clearer on this point when he com-
ments on the Scripture passage, “The Son came down from Heaven, not to 
do His own Will, but the Will of Him That sent Him.” “But since, as this 
[Scripture passage] is the language of Him Who assumed our Nature (for He 
it was Who came down), and not of the Nature which He assumed, we must 
meet the objection in this way, that the passage does not mean that the Son 
has a special will of His own, besides that of the Father, but that He has not; 
so that the meaning would be, “not to do Mine own Will, for there is none of 
Mine apart from, but that which is common to, Me and Thee; for as We have 
one Godhead, so We have one Will.”12
In this passage Gregory of Nazianzus posits one divine will, but he uses 
different pronouns: the Son uses “me” to refer to the Son and uses “thee” 
to refer to the Father. He might be interpreted as suggesting that the divine 
persons have their own thoughts and their own intellectual power(s) be-
cause a divine person uses a personal pronoun and its reference is fixed by 
the context of its use. But on the Latin Social model developed below, it is 
not required that each person have his own intellectual power(s) in order 
to use mental tokens that include indexical terms like “I” and “me.”
We might wonder why one should make the inference from (numer-
ical) unity of nature to (numerical) unity of will (or unity of intellect) and 
vice versa. In sections 3–5. I develop a Latin Social model of the Trinity 
that answers these questions and entails NA. In the subsequent sections I 
critique Swinburne’s and Hasker’s social models and Leftow’s non-social 
model, showing that they do not entail NA.
3. Developing a Latin Social Model
I assume, without argument here, that there is just one concrete instance 
or trope of the divine nature, that the one divine nature is a constituent 
of each divine person, that each divine person is constituted by the one 
divine nature and by some incommunicable attribute (e.g., begetting, being 
begotten, or being spirated).13 What the divine persons share in common 
11Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, “Concerning We Should Think of Saying That There are Not 
Three Gods to Ablabius,” 157.
12Barnes, “Divine Unity and the Divided Self,” 489–490.
13Talk of the “constitution of divine persons” can be clearly found in scholastic theolo-
gians like Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus, and more recently with Jeffrey Brower, 
Michael Rea, and William Hasker. While the model on offer doesn’t require one version 
or another of a constitution account of the Trinity, I’m inclined to think that overall Duns 
Scotus’s is preferable. The model on offer does not require a commitment to the persons’ in-
communicable attributes being real relations or absolute properties. Either one may do. For 
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is the one communicable divine nature, and what ontologically distin-
guishes them are their incommunicable attributes, which are traditionally 
called “personal” properties. I hold that each divine person is constituted 
as a person ontologically and explanatorily prior to any thoughts or voli-
tions that that person has or might have, such as being self-aware, aware 
of others, or loving another. (For example, I deny that e.g., God the Son’s 
understanding X constitutes [or partially constitutes] God the Son as a 
person.) The divine persons have their rational powers (i.e., intellect, will) 
in virtue of the one divine nature. Consequently, the divine persons share 
numerically the same rational powers of intellect and will. Further, I hold 
that each divine person is essentially numerically the same divine nature 
as the one divine nature without being identical to it.14 A divine person 
is not identical to the one divine nature because the divine person has a 
constituent, namely a personal property that is not identical to the one 
divine nature.
These claims put the model outside the fold of some social models of 
the Trinity that hold that the divine persons do not share numerically the 
same powers of intellect and will.15 However, as will become clear, one 
way to name the model in the contemporary analytic theology context is 
that it is a Latin Social model of the Trinity. For this model has it that all of 
the persons can use a mental token of “I” to refer to themselves. But as will 
be seen, the “Latin” part of the model has it that divine persons share all 
uses of all divine mental tokens, including mental tokens of “I,” such that 
in numerically the same use of a mental token of “I” the Father refers to 
the Father, the Son refers to the Son, and the Holy Spirit refers to the Holy 
Spirit. (See section 4 for details.) Analogous reasoning applies to divine 
volitions. (See section 5 for details.)
It might be important to add some clarifications about the divine nature 
and the constitution of the divine persons. The model on offer is influ-
enced by the Trinitarian theologies of the scholastic theologians Richard 
of St. Victor, Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus. It is from Henry that 
I am developing a Latin social model.16 (Henry’s Trinitarian theology is 
unknown to most because of a dearth of systematic literature on it.) And, 
although it is in Henry of Ghent, it is in Duns Scotus who most succinctly 
and clearly describes the singular divine nature and divine persons.
an excellent discussion of relative versus absolute person constitution in scholastic theology, 
see Friedman, Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University,” 341–375. The terms “pater-
nity” (paternitas), “filiation” (filiatio) and “passive spiration” (spiratio passiva) are commonly 
used in scholastic theology for the incommunicable personal properties.
14See Williams, “Indexicals and the Trinity,” 84 and references there. I discuss the notion 
of “essential numerical sameness without identity” in “Henry of Ghent on Real Relations 
and the Trinity,” 111–115.
15Cf. Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations of a Christian Worldview, 583: “The 
central commitment of social trinitarianism is that in God there are three distinct centers of 
self-consciousness, each with its proper intellect and will.” Cited in Hasker, Metaphysics and 
the Tri-Personal God, 25.
16See Williams, Henry of Ghent on the Trinity.
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For Duns Scotus, the one divine nature is like an Aristotelian primary 
substance and like a secondary substance in only certain respects.17 There 
is no straightforward parallel from Aristotelian primary substances and 
secondary substances to the divine persons and the one divine nature.18 
On Duns Scotus’s view, the divine nature or substance is like a primary 
substance in the sense that it is numerically one, exists per se (as opposed to 
contingently inhering in a subject), and is concrete (rather than abstract). 
But it is not like a primary substance in the sense that it is incommuni-
cable. The divine nature is and so can be communicated from, e.g., God 
the Father to God the Son. Further, the divine nature is like a secondary 
substance in the sense that it is communicable—it is and so can be com-
municated from one divine person (or persons) to another divine person. 
Lastly, while Duns Scotus himself maintains that the divine nature is not 
a subject of accidents (contingent properties), I wish to remain neutral 
on this question. The Latin Social model developed here is meant to be 
neutral with regard to divine immutability, so that proponents of divine 
immutability or divine mutability can find the model plausible.
Further, each divine person is like a primary substance in the sense that 
each exists per se (in virtue of the one divine nature that is a constituent 
of the persons), each is concrete (rather than abstract), and each is incom-
municable (in virtue of an incommunicable attribute that is not identical 
to the divine nature).
The description of “person” that this model uses is that of Richard of St. 
Victor, according to whom a person is “an incommunicable existence of an 
intellectual nature.”19 “Intellectual nature” refers to intellectual power(s) 
and will power(s). I take “power” to entail a possibility for an act, whether 
the act is likely or unlikely (perhaps because of some impediment) for the 
metaphysical subject in question. If a metaphysical subject is a person, 
then the subject is a person explanatorily prior to any intellectual act or 
volitional act she might have.
This description of a person can be satisfied by primarily diverse entities. 
A human being, Peter, is a person because his humanity (I am neutral here 
on the question of dualism or materialism) is an incommunicable existence 
and is an intellectual nature. If pushed, we might say Peter’s humanity (as 
opposed to humanity as such) is the truth-maker for his personhood. In con-
trast, God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit is each a person 
because the one divine nature is the truth-maker for their intellectual nature, 
and each personal property is the truth-maker for their incommunicability. 
Each divine person, as a person, is constituted by the one communicable 
divine nature and an incommunicable personal property.20 If there were no 
17See Cross, Duns Scotus on God, 233–244.
18Cf. Cross, Duns Scotus on God, 165–170.
19For references and discussion, cf. Cross, Duns Scotus on God, 158–163.
20For Duns Scotus’s discussion of this, see The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture: Repor-
tatio I-A, 287–293.
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incommunicable properties, then there would be no divine person despite 
there being the one divine nature that grounds intellectual power(s) and 
will power(s). Personhood requires something incommunicable and given 
that the divine nature is not incommunicable, it is not a person.
Given my commitment to a pro-Nicene Trinitarian theology and the 
above claims, I do not, for example, assume a modern notion of personhood 
according to which persons are “distinct centers of knowledge, will, love, 
and action . . . distinct centers of consciousness.”21 A feature of this concep-
tion, as I understand it, is that a person is a person by being constituted 
(at least in part) by cognitive acts, or by being identified with a stream of 
intellectual and volitional acts. Hence, there are non-identical persons only 
if there are subjects with incommunicable cognitive acts. I do not apply 
this notion to the divine persons. On the medieval view I endorse, a person 
is a person ontologically and explanatorily prior to any cognitive acts or 
volitions that that person in question has or might have.22 The relevant in-
communicable item is begetting for the Father, being begotten for the Son, 
and being spirated for the Holy Spirit. The persons’ divine cognitive acts, 
on the view I endorse, are communicable (and not incommunicable). I wish 
to be sensitive to the way(s) in which orthodox Christian theologians have 
developed a notion of “person” applicable to divine persons.23 After all, the 
terms “persona” and “hypostasis,” as I understand them, are theological 
terms of art developed by ancient and medieval Christian theologians for 
the purpose of giving an account of the Trinity and of the Incarnation. Such 
accounts of personhood were not intended to be an explanation of legal 
and moral responsibility as is often the case in modern accounts such as 
John Locke’s.
4. Mental Tokens, Indexicals, and a Latin Social Trinity
In a previous article, “Indexicals and the Trinity: Two Non-Social Models” 
I drew attention to details about context-sensitive tokens that can be put 
to use in Trinitarian theology.24 I want to put these to use in a Latin Social 
account of NA. Following John Perry, I distinguished the production of 
a token and the act of using a token.25 In everyday life the production of 
21Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, 24, quoting Plantinga, “Social Trinity and 
Tritheism,” 22.
22This is consistent with, but does not require, e.g., Thomas Aquinas’s claim that God the 
Father generates God the Son by an intellectual act of self-understanding. The claim here is 
that e.g., God the Son’s own act of understanding is not constitutive of his own personhood, 
even if God the Father’s intellectual production of God the Son is constitutive of God the Son. 
I am not inclined to agree with Aquinas in light of criticisms by Henry of Ghent and Duns 
Scotus. For discussion, see Williams, “Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and 
John Duns Scotus,” 48–49. 
23In a similar vein, I wish to preserve classical Trinitarian uses of pronouns such that “he,” 
“she” and “one” can be used to refer to divine persons. I make no ontological ascription of 
gender to divine persons despite using various pronouns. 
24Williams, “Indexicals and the Trinity,” 74–94.
25Williams, “Indexicals and the Trinity,” 78–83.
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a spoken token and its use usually overlap. When I produce the verbal 
token of, “I am happy,” I also use this token. But the identity conditions 
for the production of a token and its use are different. Perry gives the fol-
lowing example.
An utterance [or use] may involve a token, but not be the act of produc-
ing it. My wife Frenchie and I were once Resident Fellows in a dormitory 
at Stanford, eating with the students each evening in the cafeteria. If she 
went to dinner before I returned, she would write on a small blackboard on 
the counter, “I have gone to the cafeteria,” and set it on the table near the 
front door of our apartment. I would put it back on the counter. There was 
no need for her to write out the message anew each time I was late; if the 
blackboard had not been used for something else in the interim, she could 
simply move it from the counter back to the table. Frenchie used the same 
token to say different things on different days. Each use of the token was a 
separate utterance.26
When John arrives home and sees the written message placed on the table, 
part of the proposition that is thought is relative to the day in which his 
wife uses the written message and it is relative to the agent’s using the 
token. Given that Frenchie uses the token on a certain day, the “I” refers 
to Frenchie because she’s using the written sign, and “today” is relative 
to the day in which she uses the token. Now, suppose Frenchie is the one 
who arrives home late and John has already left for dinner. And, sup-
pose John puts the written sign on the table such that he uses numerically 
the same token that Frenchie had produced. When Frenchie arrives home 
she will understand the “I” to refer to John (and not to her), even though 
she originally produced the written token on the chalkboard. The agent 
that produces a token typically uses the produced token, but so too could 
another agent use the token. A token of “I” is relative to the agent using 
it such that different agents could use numerically the same token. The 
agent using the token of “I,” and not the agent that produced the token, 
fixes its reference.
It seems to me that there is an analogy from written sentences to mental 
sentences, given that both have syntactic structure and semantic content. 
They are not the same, of course, but they are analogous. If this is right, 
then we can say that an individual sentence, its production, and its use, 
are analogous to an individual mental sentence (called a mental token), its 
production, and its use. Given this, we can hazard a theological posit that 
non-identical humans using the same written indexical token is analogous 
to non-identical divine persons using the same mental indexical token. 
One difference between the human agents’ uses of an individual written 
sentence and the divine persons’ uses of a mental token is that in the 
former case the agents’ uses of the individual sentence are numerically 
different but in the latter case the divine persons’ use of a mental token are 
numerically the same. (For example, the Father’s using the mental token 
26Perry, The Problem of the Essential Indexical, 318–319.
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of “I am wise” is numerically the same use as the Son’s using the same 
mental token of “I am wise.”) The divine persons’ uses of a mental token 
are numerically the same because they share numerically the same divine 
nature that is the ground of their rational powers.
Why is it that the persons’ shared intellectual power is supposed to 
entail that the persons share numerically the same use of a mental token? 
Intellectual power can be divided into active intellectual power and pas-
sive intellectual power. (Henry of Ghent largely inspires this analysis of 
divine powers.27) Active intellectual power and passive intellectual power 
are correlatives; they mutually imply one another. (What follows should 
not be understood as an endorsement of potentiality and actuality as con-
traries in God. Talk of active and passive powers grounded in the divine 
essence should be interpreted as compatible with there being no change 
in God. Talk of active and passive powers should also be interpreted as 
being compatible with there being change in God. The Latin Social model 
is meant to be neutral on the question of whether God changes. Replace 
“power” with “possibility” if it reads more easily.) Active intellectual 
power is that by which a person can produce and can use mental tokens. If 
a person has active intellectual power and a mental token, then this person 
can use this mental token to think a proposition. (By “to think” I mean to 
be aware of, or to entertain, some proposition.) Furthermore, passive intel-
lectual power is that by which a person can be united with a mental token 
and can be united with an individual use of a mental token. A rock cannot 
be united with the using of a mental token because it fails to have the 
required passive power. But a divine person can be united with the using 
of a mental token because the person has the required passive power. It is 
one thing to be united with using a mental token and another thing to use 
a mental token. The former requires passive intellectual power and the 
latter requires active intellectual power. Now, if there are several persons 
that share numerically the same divine nature, then these persons share 
numerically the same intellectual divine powers, namely numerically the 
same active intellectual power and numerically the same passive intel-
lectual power. If a divine person (e.g., the Father) is united to the use of a 
mental token, then the one divine nature is united to this use of a mental 
token. If another divine person (e.g., the Son) is united to numerically the 
same divine nature, then any use of a mental token that is united to the one 
divine nature also is united to this other person (e.g., the Son). So, if God 
the Father uses a mental token and this use of the mental token is united to 
the one divine nature, and God the Son is united to numerically the same 
divine nature, then God the Son is united to this use of the mental token. 
Thus, if the Father uses a mental token and the Son uses the same mental 
27Henry of Ghent cleverly distinguished active and passive potencies (powers) in God as 
logical possibilities that are compatible with actuality, and not as contraries of “potency” and 
“actuality” as most other scholastics had assumed. See Henry of Ghent, Summa of Ordinary 
Questions, Articles 35, 36, 42, 45, 31–37, 49–50. For discussion of this, see Williams, Henry of 
Ghent on the Trinity.
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token and the Holy Spirit uses the same mental token, then the Father’s 
use, the Son’s use, and the Holy Spirit’s use of the same mental token are 
numerically the same use of the mental token. The Father cannot, so to 
speak, get away with using a mental token and not sharing that use of 
that mental token with every other divine person united to numerically 
the same divine nature. The Father’s sharing numerically the same use of 
a mental token is a metaphysical necessity because his intellectual powers 
that are grounded in the one divine nature are communicable and com-
municated to every other divine person. Thus, the divine persons share 
numerically the same use of a divine mental token.
The divine persons share numerically the same use of a mental token 
because they share numerically the same active and passive intellectual 
powers (which are correlatives), and they share numerically the same in-
tellectual powers because they share numerically the same divine nature 
that grounds their intellectual powers. Given this view, the Father’s use of 
the mental token of, “I am wise,” is numerically the same use as the Son’s 
use of this mental token and the Holy Spirit’s use of this mental token. The 
Father’s using the mental token, “I am wise,” entails that the Father thinks 
that the Father is wise. The Son’s using the same mental token of, “I am 
wise,” entails that the Son thinks that the Son is wise. Likewise, the Holy 
Spirit’s using the same mental token of, “I am wise,” entails that the Holy 
Spirit thinks that the Holy Spirit is wise. The divine persons are aware of 
different propositions if they use a mental token with the indexical “I” in 
it. In cases where the divine mental token includes no indexicals, what the 
persons think in using a mental token is the same. If God the Father uses 
the mental token, “Love is a good,” then the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit 
think the same proposition. Each person thinks the proposition that love 
is a good.
One worry about the claim that the persons share numerically the same 
use of the same mental token and think different propositions is that there 
seems to be a problem with the identity conditions of a use of a mental 
token. In using a mental token of “I am God,” God the Father thinks that 
God the Father is God. (I leave the sense of the copula ambiguous for 
now.) Likewise, in using a mental token of “I am God,” God the Son thinks 
that God the Son is God. Isn’t a use of a mental token tied to the particular 
proposition that is thought? Isn’t it the case that the identity of a use of 
mental token includes the proposition that is thought? Although it often 
is the case that a use of a token entails that one proposition is thought, it 
is not always the case. There can be one use of a token by which several 
propositions are thought, so long as the semantics and syntactic structure 
of the token, and its context, allows for the thinking of several proposi-
tions to obtain. Before I gave the example of Bilbo Baggins saying “Good 
Morning!” to Gandalf.28 We are told that Bilbo thinks several propositions 
in this one use of the token “Good Morning!” He says that he wishes 
28Cf. Williams, “Indexicals and the Trinity,” 82.
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Gandalf a good morning, that it is a good morning, that Bilbo feels good 
this morning, and that it is a morning to be good on. What licenses one use 
of the token to correspond to different propositions are various contexts 
or indices of the use of the token. Contexts include the agent Bilbo, the 
morning, the green grass, the sun shining, and Bilbo’s speaking to Gan-
dalf. If one use of a token can entail different propositions depending on 
the right contexts of the use of the token, then we can say, analogously, 
that numerically the same use of a divine mental token can entail different 
propositions just so long as the use of the mental token has the relevant 
contexts, namely the relevant divine agents using the mental token, and 
the semantics and syntax allow it.
Sometimes the predicate in a mental token is “God.” A traditional theo-
logical analysis of this term, which can be found in John of Damascus,29 
is that “God” can be used to refer to the divine nature as such or it can be 
used to refer to a person who is divine. I agree with this understanding of 
the term “God.” If divine persons were to use “God” in these ways, then 
the following would be the analysis of that. The Father’s using a mental 
token of “I am God” entails that the Father thinks that the Father is a di-
vine person, or, it entails that the Father thinks that the Father is essentially 
numerically the same as the divine nature without being identical to it, 
or, it entails both. Similar reasoning applies to the Son’s and Holy Spirit’s 
use of the same mental token. When a believer addresses God in saying 
“Dear God . . . ” she may either be addressing the divine nature as such or 
a person who is divine. I suspect that most believers typically intend the 
latter, though the former is also possible.
In cases in which the predicate in the mental token refers to a particular 
divine person, e.g., God the Father, what the copula expresses is relative 
to the agent using the token. If the agent is the same person as the person 
referred to in the predicate, then the copula expresses identity. If the agent 
is not the same person as the person referred to in the predicate, then the 
copula expresses essential numerical sameness without identity. (I am un-
aware of any creaturely analogue to this. It is the divine persons’ sharing 
numerically the same nature, numerically the same uses of a mental 
token, and omniscience, that render this a unique case.) For example, if 
the Father uses a mental token of “I am God the Father” and in so doing 
affirms a proposition, then the Father affirms that God the Father is iden-
tical to God the Father. If the Son uses the same mental token of “I am God 
the Father” so as to affirm a proposition and never affirms something false 
(given omniscience), then relative to the Son, the Son affirms the proposi-
tion that the Son is essentially numerically the same divine nature as the 
Father without being identical to the Father.
If we held that God the Father didn’t have or use a mental token of “I 
am God the Father,” then God the Father would not, as it were, know who 
29John of Damascus, Writings, 275. Henry of Ghent makes the same claim; for references 
see Scott Williams, “Indexicals and the Trinity,” 85n15.
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he is, but that seems unlikely given divine omniscience. So, a way around 
this worry is to note that a proposition affirmed in using a mental token 
is relative to the agent using the mental token. Each divine person uses 
numerically the same mental token of “I am God the Father” but only 
the Father affirms identity with God the Father, and the Son and Holy 
Spirit affirm something different. The Son affirms that the Son is essen-
tially numerically the same divine nature as God the Father without being 
identical to God the Father. The Holy Spirit affirms that the Holy Spirit is 
essentially numerically the same divine nature as God the Father without 
being identical to God the Father. Each divine person affirms something 
true in numerically the same use of numerically the same divine mental 
token of “I am God the Father.” The Father is aware of one thing, the Son 
is aware of something different, and the Holy Spirit is aware of something 
different.
This way of analyzing mental tokens that include the indexical “I” and 
the ambiguous copula is a general theory for divine mental tokens. It can 
be generalized to all cases of divine mental tokens that the include the 
indexical “I” and the ambiguous copula. One challenge for this theory is 
whether a use of a mental token can be ascribed to a divine person but 
the theory predicts (so to speak) that a divine person affirms something 
false or contrary to revelation. Consider a case where the indexical “me” 
is in a mental token, e.g., a mental token of “The Father loves me.” In 
using this mental token the Father would think that the Father loves the 
Father, the Son would think that the Father loves the Son, and the Holy 
Spirit would think that the Father loves the Holy Spirit. Some supposed 
counterexamples would require a complicated analysis from this general 
theory. Nonetheless, I strongly suspect that responses can be given. For 
any putative verb can be reduced to a copula plus the verb. The theory 
on offer can analyze what each divine person would affirm in using such 
a mental token (if they use such a mental token) such that each person 
affirms something true and does not contradict revelation. For example, 
a mental token of “The Son and I are sent, and the Father is not sent”30 
would be revised as “The Son and I are ones who are sent, and the Father 
is not sent.” In this case, the Father would affirm that the Son is sent and 
the Father is essentially numerically the same divine nature as without 
being identical to one who is sent, and the Father is not sent. The Son 
would affirm that the Son is sent and the Son is essentially numerically 
the same divine nature as without being identical to one who is sent, and 
the Father is not sent. The Holy Spirit would affirm that the Son is sent 
and the Holy Spirit is sent, and the Father is not sent. In each case the “I” 
refers to the agent using the mental token; but what is expressed by the 
copula is relative to the agent using the copula and the sense expressed 
by the copula is constrained by the fact that the divine persons cannot 
affirm falsehoods. I do not claim that the divine persons in fact use such a 
30Thanks to Michael Rea for this example.
333UNITY OF ACTION IN A LATIN SOCIAL MODEL OF THE TRINITY
mental token, but only that if they do, then this analysis is coherent and is 
consistent with revelation.31
Another worry about this Latin Social model is the appeal to mental 
tokens (individual mental sentences) rather than to propositions alone. 
Why not say that the divine persons affirm and will different propositions 
and leave out mental tokens of sentences entirely? Suppose we say that 
divine persons affirm and will propositions without using a mental token 
of a sentence type. If the divine persons affirm only true propositions, then 
there would be some intellectual acts by which the Father affirms proposi-
tions true only of the Father. Consequently, the Son and Holy Spirit would 
have different intellectual acts from one another and from the Father. On 
this account, the divine persons would not share intellectual acts. The 
Father would have one intellectual act, e.g., the act of affirming that he is 
identical to the Father, and that the Son would not have this intellectual act. 
This account suggests that the persons have distinct and incommunicable 
intellectual and volitional acts only if each person has distinct and incom-
municable intellectual power(s) and volitional power(s). But in order to 
posit distinct and incommunicable intellectual power(s) and volitional 
power(s) we need an argument for numerically distinct and incommu-
nicable rational powers for each divine person. In section 6, I consider 
Hasker’s argument from the essential indexical “I” for there being numer-
ically distinct and incommunicable intellectual power(s) and volitional 
power(s) for each divine person. I contend that this argument fails. If I am 
right, then we do not have independent reason to suppose that there are 
numerically distinct and incommunicable intellectual power(s) and voli-
tional power(s) for each divine person. If the Latin Social model accounts 
for the divine persons’ affirming and willing some different propositions 
without positing additional intellectual power(s) and volitional power(s) 
and it entails NA while the other account does not entail NA, then the 
Latin Social model is simpler with regard to the number of intellectual and 
volitional powers and so is more likely.
5. Volitions and Necessary Agreement
The account of divine acts of using mental tokens sets the framework for 
understanding divine volitions. Just as there are intellectual powers, uses 
of mental tokens, and the propositions that are thought, so too are there 
volitional powers, volitions, and propositions that are willed.
On the Latin Social model on offer, there is just one divine nature and 
it grounds divine volitional powers. Like intellectual powers, volitional 
powers can be divided into active volitional power and passive volitional 
power (which are correlatives). Active volitional power is the power to 
31Perhaps this unexpected scenario is a consequence of the divine persons’ “perichoresis.” 
There is some sense in which the divine persons are “in” each other. Note John 14:11 where 
Jesus says, “Believe me that I am in the Father and the Father is in me.” The translation is 
from the New Oxford Annotated Bible, 3rd ed., 2001. See also Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate, 
p. 75, lines 14–16. For references and discussion, see Cross, Duns Scotus on God, 170–172.
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produce a volition, and passive volitional power is the power to be united 
to a volition. A human being can produce volitions and be united to the 
volitions she produces. Olivia, for example, can bring about a willing to 
eat vanilla ice cream, and Olivia has this willing to eat ice cream only if 
she can be united to it.
An agent’s volition is an act of willing (or rejecting, or “niling”) directed 
toward a proposition that is thought by the agent in using a mental token. 
Typically we affirm a proposition or reject a proposition or are indifferent 
toward a proposition. What a person wills depends on what she thinks. 
I will that p only if I think that p. (Recall that by “to think” I mean that 
someone is aware of, or entertains, some proposition.) For a volition to be 
directed at a proposition, that proposition must be somehow cognitively 
present to the person. The proposition must be present to the willer, and 
the proposition is present to the willer (in part) by means of the willer’s 
intellect and the relevant mental token. So, for a volition to be directed 
at a proposition, the proposition depends on its being somehow thought 
by the person. A proposition can be cognitively present to a willer either 
dispositionally or occurrently. In both cases, if the proposition in question 
is expressed by a mental token that includes an indexical term (e.g., “I”) or 
an ambiguous copula then the proposition in question depends on certain 
contexts, e.g., the agent. Consider a divine mental token of “I am one who 
loves God the Son.” Suppose each divine person intellectually uses this 
mental token and wills what is thought in using it. By intellectually using 
this mental token, God the Father thinks that God the Father loves God 
the Son; God the Son thinks that God the Son loves God the Son; and, God 
the Holy Spirit thinks that God the Holy Spirit loves God the Son. If God 
the Father wills what is thought in using this mental token and what is 
thought in this case is relative to the agent, then God the Father wills that 
God the Father loves God the Son. Similarly, God the Son wills that God 
the Son loves God the Son; and, God the Holy Spirit wills that God the 
Holy Spirit loves God the Son.
What remains to be seen is whether the divine persons share numeri-
cally the same volitions, that is, whether they share the same act of willing 
what is thought in using a mental token. Recall that on this model there 
is just one instance of the divine nature and so just one active divine will 
power and one passive divine will power. Whatever volitions are elicited 
by a divine person are united to the divine person because the divine 
person is united to the one divine nature. Since all divine persons are 
united to numerically the same divine nature and will power(s), it follows 
that all divine persons are united to all divine volitions that are united 
to the one divine nature. So, all divine volitions are shared by the divine 
persons, even if what each divine person wills differs in cases in which 
what is willed depends on a person’s using a mental token that includes 
the indexical “I” or an ambiguous copula.
In sum, there is a parallel structure between a thought (which consists 
of an agent using a mental token) and a volition (which consists of an 
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agent willing, or rejecting, or niling whatever proposition (or proposi-
tions) is thought in an agent’s using a mental token). Just as the divine 
persons’ using a mental token that includes the indexical “I” entails dif-
ferent propositions that are thought, so too divine persons’ use of a mental 
token that includes the indexical “I” entails different propositions that are 
willed (or rejected or niled) if what is thought is willed (or rejected or 
niled). The divine persons share numerically the same use of the same 
mental token but think different propositions relative to the agent using 
the mental token. Likewise, they share numerically the same volition of 
willing what is thought in the same use of the same mental token but will 
different propositions relative to what the particular agent thinks.
A theologically desirable consequence of this model of shared divine 
volitions is that it is not metaphysically possible for the divine persons to 
fail to agree in their volitions, including cases of permissible alternatives. 
Agreement of volition is secured metaphysically prior to any particular 
volition. For, the Father cannot, so to speak, get away with having an act of 
willing what is thought in using a mental token without the Son and Holy 
Spirit also having numerically the same act of willing what is thought in 
numerically the same use of numerically the same mental token. If God the 
Father wills that the Earth revolve around the sun in a clockwise direction, 
and divine persons necessarily share numerically the same divine voli-
tions, then God the Son and God the Holy Spirit will that the Earth revolve 
around the sun in a clockwise direction. There is no sense in which the 
persons must negotiate with one another regarding what is to be willed in 
the case of permissible alternatives. In fact, negotiation between the divine 
persons (in using divine mental tokens) is metaphysically impossible. 
There is no cognitive or volitional gap, so to speak, between the divine 
persons, just as Gregory of Nyssa said, “No postponement occurs, or is 
thought of, in the movement of the divine will from the Father through 
the Son to the Spirit.”32
The ways in which persons would fail to agree in their volitions is 
whether they will contradictory things or what they will entails contradic-
tory things. Persons have a lack of agreement of volitions if and only if (i) 
one wills p and another wills ~p, or (ii) one wills p and another wills q and 
q entails ~p, or (iii) one person wills p and another nils p. (For (iii), imagine 
Bob wills that he and his wife Sally go to restaurant X for dinner, but Sally 
nils what Bob wills. In such a case, Sally does not agree with Bob and a dis-
pute or negotiation can arise.) Swinburne gives an example of (ii) in which 
God the Father wills that the Earth revolve one way around the sun and 
God the Son wills that the Earth revolve the opposite way around the sun. 
The Son’s volition entails the denial of what the Father wills. But on the 
Latin Social model it is not metaphysically possible for the divine persons 
to fail to agree because they share numerically the same volitional powers 
32Gregory of Nyssa, “Concerning We Should Think of Saying That There are Not Three 
Gods to Ablabius,” 157.
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that are grounded in the one divine nature and so they share numerically 
the same divine volitions. If the Father uses a mental token and wills what 
is thought in using the mental token, then the Son and Holy Spirit also use 
the mental token and will what is thought in using the mental token. So, 
if the Father wills that the Earth revolve clockwise around the sun, then 
the Son and the Holy Spirit will the same thing by numerically the same 
volition.
Scenarios (i), (ii), and (iii) are incompatible with the Latin Social model 
because the model (a) denies that there are numerically distinct and 
incommunicable active will powers and numerically distinct and incom-
municable passive will powers, (b) affirms that there is just one active 
divine will power and one passive divine will power, and (c) affirms that 
all divine volitions are shared among the divine persons. A consequence of 
(a)–(c) is that the all divine volitions are communicable and communicated 
among the divine persons. There is no possible world in which, e.g., the 
Father wills that p and the Son wills that ~p, or the Father wills that p and 
the Son and Holy Spirit do not will that p, or the Father wills that p and the 
Holy Spirit wills that q which entails ~p, or the Son wills that p and the Holy 
Spirit nils that p. If the Son wills that p, then it follows from the fact that 
the persons share numerically the same will powers and volitions that the 
Father and Holy Spirit will that p.
However, suppose there is strong independent reason to posit three 
divine will powers. If that is so, then perhaps the Latin Social model is to 
be abandoned. Hasker argues from the nature of the essential indexical 
“I” to the conclusion that there must be three divine will powers. I discuss 
this argument in the next section and argue that it fails. The analysis of 
the essential indexical “I” provided by the Latin Social model removes the 
purported necessity in positing three divine will powers.
6. The Argument from the Essential Indexical “I”
Hasker offers an argument from the essential indexical “I” to the conclu-
sion that there are numerically different (and incommunicable) intellectual 
power(s) and volitional power(s).33 Hasker reports that pro-Nicene parties 
agree that all divine persons will that God the Son shall become incarnate. 
God the Father wills that God the Son shall become incarnate. God the 
Son wills that God the Son shall become incarnate. And, God the Holy 
Spirit wills that God the Son shall become incarnate. Hasker claims that 
only God the Son willed that “I shall become incarnate.” Hasker assumes, 
in accord with Christian revelation, that neither the Father nor the Holy 
Spirit willed that “I shall become incarnate.” This assumption seems to 
make sense and coheres with revelation. After all, the referent of “I” in 
the sentence is only God the Son, is it not? Given the claim that neither the 
Father nor the Holy Spirit willed that “I shall become incarnate,” Hasker 
infers that the divine persons must have numerically different faculties 
33Cf. Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, 206–207.
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(powers) of intellect and will in order for God the Son to will something 
that the Father and Holy Spirit do not will. I reconstruct Hasker’s argu-
ment as follows:
1. If the Son wills that i (where i stands for the proposition that I shall 
become incarnate) and the Father and Holy Spirit do not will that i, 
then the divine persons have numerically distinct (and incommuni-
cable) will powers.
2. The Son wills that i and the Father and Holy Spirit do not will that i.
3. Therefore, the divine persons have numerically distinct (and incom-
municable) will powers.
A similar modus ponens can be constructed for distinct (and incommu-
nicable) intellectual powers by replacing “wills” with “knows” and “will 
power” with “intellectual power.”
This argument from the essential indexical “I” has some persuasive 
force to it and even seems obvious. However, it loses its force once one 
realizes that there is an alternative analysis of divine thoughts and voli-
tions that does not support Hasker’s conclusion. Given the Latin Social 
analysis of divine mental tokens that include the indexical “I” and the 
ambiguous copula, we have reason to deny the conditional statement and 
so judge the argument to be unsound. The analysis given by a Latin Social 
model can be stated in three points. First, the statement, “I shall become 
incarnate” is to be understood as a mental token and not a proposition, 
and it is better rendered “I shall be one who becomes incarnate.” Second, 
the proposition that a divine person thinks in using this mental token, and 
wills, is relative to the agent given the presence of the indexical “I” and the 
ambiguous copula (“shall be”). The Father’s using this mental token en-
tails that the Father thinks that the Father shall be essentially numerically 
the same divine nature as the one who becomes incarnate without being 
identical to the one who becomes incarnate. Likewise, the Holy Spirit’s 
using this mental token entails that the Holy Spirit thinks that the Holy 
Spirit shall be essentially numerically the same divine nature as the one 
who becomes incarnate without being identical to the one who becomes 
incarnate. But, the Son’s using this mental token entails that the Son thinks 
that the Son shall be identical to the one who becomes incarnate. Third, 
the proposition willed by a divine person depends on what the person 
thinks in using the mental token. The Father wills what the Father thinks; 
the Son wills what the Son thinks; and the Holy Spirit wills what the Holy 
Spirit thinks. The divine persons think and will different propositions in 
sharing numerically the same use of the same mental token of “I shall 
be one who becomes incarnate” and in sharing numerically the same act 
of willing what is thought in using this mental token. Nevertheless, the 
divine persons share numerically the same active intellectual power and 
passive intellectual power, and numerically the same active will power 
and passive will power. Consequently, to posit numerically distinct (and 
338 Faith and Philosophy
incommunicable) rational powers for each divine person is not necessary, 
and so is superfluous, for the persons to think and will different proposi-
tions.
Further, the Latin Social model would revise the antecedent of the con-
ditional statement. The interlocutor should grant this revision because it is 
consistent with the interlocutor’s own position. The antecedent would be 
revised by adding that the Father wills that the Father shall be essentially 
numerically the same divine nature as the one who shall become incar-
nate without being identical to the one who shall become incarnate, and 
the Holy Spirit wills that the Holy Spirit shall be essentially numerically 
the same divine nature as the one who shall become incarnate without 
being identical to the one who shall become incarnate. (If the interlocutor 
is unwilling to accept the notion of essential numerical sameness without 
identity, then all that is needed is some sense of the copula that is not 
identity or predication and involves numerical sameness.) Call the add-on 
for what the Father wills “a” and for what the Holy Spirit wills “b.” Now 
1 becomes 1′:
1′. If the Son wills that i and the Father and Holy Spirit do not will that 
i, and the Father wills that a and the Holy Spirit wills that b, then 
the divine persons have numerically distinct (and incommunicable) 
will powers.
But the antecedent in 1′ is sufficient for a disjunction, given the Latin Social 
model. That is, 1″:
1″. If the Son wills that i and the Father and Holy Spirit do not will that 
i, and the Father wills that a and the Holy Spirit wills that b, then 
either the divine persons have numerically distinct (and incommu-
nicable) intellectual powers, will powers, acts of intellect and acts of 
will, or the divine persons have numerically the same intellectual 
powers, will powers, uses of mental tokens, and acts of will.
By positing the antecedent of 1″ in the second premise, what follows in 
the conclusion is the disjunction. Consequently, the argument from the 
essential indexical “I” does not establish the necessity of the persons 
having numerically distinct intellectual power(s) and will power(s). Given 
that this argument fails to establish the necessity of the persons having 
numerically distinct powers, we do not have independent reason to hold 
that there are numerically distinct intellectual power(s) and will power(s) 
among the divine persons.
At this point the reader may wonder what I have to say about the Incar-
nation. So far I have spoken only of divine mental tokens, and I have not 
spoken of created mental tokens. In the Incarnation God the Son comes to 
have and use created mental tokens. It is outside the scope of this paper 
to address the metaphysics of the Incarnation. Suffice it to say, if there is 
a possibility of conflict between God the Father and God the Son with 
regard to e.g., God the Son’s suffering on the cross, then this possibility 
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would depend on the fact that God the Son has and uses created mental 
tokens that the God the Father does not have or use. I say nothing here 
about whether the antecedent is true. I only wish to indicate that on my 
view a consequence of the Incarnation is that God the Son has and uses 
created mental tokens in addition to divine mental tokens.
7. Against Social “Modern” Persons and Non-Social “Lockean” Persons
Richard Swinburne, William Hasker, and Brian Leftow have constructed 
models of the Trinity in which a divine person is either like a “modern 
person” or like a “Locke-person.” Both Swinburne and Hasker claim that 
divine persons are like a “modern person” in the sense that a person is 
a subject that has distinct and incommunicable intellectual power(s) and 
volitional power(s) and has distinct and incommunicable acts of intellect 
and acts of will.34 Leftow claims that divine persons are like Locke-persons 
in the sense that a person
is conscious, acts, and loves. . . . [P]ersons comes to exist when their ‘con-
sciousness’ begins. A Locke-person, then, is a subject of mental states who 
exists if a substance or substance(s) generate(s) certain mental states or 
events.35
What the social models of Swinburne and Hasker share with the non-social 
model of Leftow is that distinct and incommunicable intellectual acts and 
volitional acts are necessary conditions for one’s being a person. Swinburne 
and Hasker do not suppose these conditions are sufficient because the sub-
ject also requires distinct and incommunicable intellectual power(s) and will 
power(s). (Perhaps one source for this way of thinking about personhood is 
Locke’s suggestion that a person is an “incommunicable consciousness.”36) 
Given the assumption that these intellectual and volitional acts are incom-
municable, such models must secure NA on a basis other than on the basis 
of the Latin Social model’s contention that such acts are communicable 
and metaphysically necessarily shared among the divine persons. In other 
words, if the divine persons do not share acts of will in general and in 
particular with regard to permissible alternatives, what prevents them 
from failing to agree on what to will in every possible world?
To block the possibility of a failure to agree on permissible alternatives, 
Hasker offers two replies. The first is an appeal to Swinburne’s contention 
that it is a morally necessary truth that the persons must agree on what to 
do.37 It would be wrong for morally perfect, omniscient, and omnipotent 
persons to disagree about any course of action. If the persons are omni-
scient, omnipotent, and morally perfect, then they would not disagree 
34Cf. Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, 99–102; Swinburne, Is There a God?, 5–8; Swin-
burne, The Existence of God, 20–21; Swinburne, The Christian God, 31. Cf. Hasker, Metaphysics 
and the Tri-Personal God, 19–26, 242.
35Leftow, “Modes without Modalism,” 367.
36Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 344.
37Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, 148–151, 208. 
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when it comes to cases in which moral necessary truths would fix which 
choice might be made.38 But, in the case of morally permissible alterna-
tives, a different reply is required. According to Swinburne,
Such unity of action could be secured if the first individual solemnly vows 
to the second individual in causing his existence that he will not initiate any 
act (of will) in a certain sphere of activity that he allocates to him, while at 
the same time the first individual requests the second individual not to initi-
ate any such act outside that sphere. The vow of the first individual would 
create an obligation on him not to initiate any act (of will) within the second 
individual’s allocated sphere of activity. . . . Each of the postulated divine 
individuals would be omnipotent in the sense that each could at any period 
of time do anything logically possible-for example, bring it about that the 
Earth moves round the Sun in a clockwise direction. But the omnipotence 
of each individual is limited by his perfect goodness, and if one individual 
has promised the other individual that he will not perform actions (when 
there is not a unique best action) in this area (e.g., the area of movements of 
heavenly bodies), then his perfect goodness limits his omnipotence so that 
he does not do such an act.39
Earlier in the text Swinburne claims that the Father decides the spheres 
over which each divine person will have allocated authority. It is the Fa-
ther, and not the Son or Holy Spirit, who decides which divine person has 
allocated authority over a given sphere because the Father is the source 
of the Son and Holy Spirit. Further, given that the Father is the parent 
or source of the other divine persons, Swinburne infers that the Son and 
Holy Spirit have a moral obligation to agree to the Father’s decision re-
garding who has allocated authority over which sphere. In short, NA with 
regard to permissible alternatives is purportedly secured on the basis of a 
moral obligation to one’s source’s (or parent’s) preference regarding the al-
location of authority in certain spheres. If the Father decided that the Son 
should have allocated authority over the direction of heavenly bodies, then 
the Father and Holy Spirit have a moral obligation to agree with the Son’s 
preference regarding the direction of revolution of the Earth around the 
sun. Given the Father’s decision on the allocation of authority regarding 
certain spheres, the divine persons would voluntarily agree in every pos-
sible world regarding permissible alternatives because the relevant moral 
obligation(s) obtains in every possible world that fixes which alternative 
among permissible alternatives is chosen.
I am not persuaded by Swinburne’s and Hasker’s appeal to respecting 
one’s source’s (or parent’s) preference about which divine person has 
allocated authority in a certain sphere with regard to cases of morally 
permissible alternatives. (It should be noted that Hasker is more satisfied 
with the second reply that I discuss below.) Although it is a desirable moral 
value that one’s source (or parent[s]) should be respected and so respect 
38Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, 209.
39Swinburne, The Christian God, 174–175.
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his or her or their preference(s), it is not obviously or clearly an obligation 
that defeats competing moral values in the context of permissible alterna-
tives. Suppose God the Father and God the Son have equally good reasons 
for their own preferred plan about which divine person has allocated au-
thority in a certain sphere. The Father prefers that the Son have allocated 
authority regarding the direction of the Earth’s revolution around the sun, 
and the Son prefers that the Father have allocated authority regarding the 
direction of the Earth’s revolution around the sun. Suppose further that 
if the Father has allocated authority in this sphere that he prefers that the 
Earth revolve clockwise and that if the Son has allocated authority in this 
sphere that he prefers that the Earth revolve counter-clockwise. These are 
metaphysically possible scenarios on a modern-personhood model of the 
Trinity. Hence, the Father and Son not only might have contradictory pref-
erences about who should decide which person has allocated authority 
about the direction of the Earth’s revolution around the sun but also con-
tradictory preferences about the direction of the Earth’s revolution around 
the sun.
Swinburne would contend that the Father’s preference regarding allo-
cated authority should win out because the Father is the source or parent. 
But consider the moral value that a parent should do what his or her or 
their child prefers in morally permissible cases just because it is one’s 
child (and not because of some additional value like providing your child 
opportunities for learning responsibility and the like; I assume that the 
divine persons are equally morally perfect, omniscient, and omnipotent). 
It is plausible that parental love implies preferring what the beloved child 
prefers in morally permissible cases. Hence, there could be a lack of agree-
ment between divine persons regarding morally permissible alternatives 
because they (initially) endorse different moral values (honoring your 
parent[s] versus honoring your child).
In one possible world the Father initially affirms and wills that hon-
oring the preference of one’s child should determine what is to be willed 
regarding permissible alternatives, and the Son initially affirms and wills 
that honoring one’s source (or parent) should determine what is to be 
willed regarding permissible alternatives. They don’t initially agree on a 
moral value that would determine which option among permissible alter-
native allocated authorities over a given sphere should be willed and so 
must negotiate. In such a possible world, the persons come to a stalemate 
by deferring to the other, and so fail to agree. In short, the persons can 
lack agreement in what they think, in what they affirm, and in what they 
will. Even if there are very few possible worlds in which lack of agreement 
obtains because somehow divine omniscience or omnipotence or perfect 
goodness prevents a lack of agreement in most possible worlds, it follows 
that NA is not secured.
Still, a defender of Swinburne might claim that it is random which 
divine person has allocated authority in a given sphere. The above objec-
tion to Swinburne from different moral values only shows that the Father 
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isn’t obviously the candidate who decides the divine persons’ allocated 
authority over a given sphere. All that is needed, says a defender of 
Swinburne, is that the divine persons agree that some mechanism ran-
domly assigns or explains allocated authority over different spheres and 
that the divine persons necessarily agree with whichever divine person 
has allocated authority over a given sphere because of their perfect moral 
goodness.40
In reply, I want to know what the mechanism would be that randomly 
assigns or explains the divine persons’ allocated authorities. It cannot be 
some divine attribute like omniscience, omnipotence, or perfect moral 
goodness, given that we are concerned here with permissible alternatives. 
It cannot be a divine person’s will, given that neither the Father’s will, 
the Son’s will, or the Holy Spirit’s will, would decide whose will decides 
the allocated authorities. The appeal to a mechanism that randomly as-
signs or explains the persons’ allocated authorities might be interpreted 
as an appeal to a brute fact. But if the mechanism is a brute fact, then the 
modern-personhood model on offer adds a new item to its explanatory 
economy in trying to secure NA. Consequently, this modern-personhood 
model is less simple in explanatory economy than the Latin Social model 
and so is less likely.
Hasker’s second reply to cases of morally permissible alternatives fo-
cuses on the divine persons’ perfect wisdom and moral goodness.
Each of the persons, being perfectly wise and good, would recognize that it 
would be a bad thing for him to insist on his own preferences in disregard of 
those of another divine person. Because of this, each would refrain from act-
ing on his own preferences until some mutually satisfactory solution could 
be agreed upon. This does not seem too much to ask from perfect wisdom 
and goodness!41
Here Hasker appeals to the divine persons’ perfect wisdom and goodness 
(and not some stipulated and agreed upon rule that determines allocated 
authority over a given sphere, as in the first sort of reply) as a way to 
secure NA regarding permissible alternatives. This seems to me a better 
reply than the first. Still, it is not satisfying. Given Hasker’s commitment to 
the divine persons’ libertarian free wills, and their power to create a world 
(even worlds), why did they create this world? Hasker doesn’t accept a 
“best possible world” hypothesis.42 So, it might just be an arbitrary good 
choice on their part to create this world rather than some other possible 
world. They know of better possible worlds to create, so perhaps they just 
agreed that some world should be created. Are the divine persons just 
exponentially lucky that they happened to create the same world among 
all the possible worlds known to the divine persons? (If they were not 
40Thanks to Mark Murphy for this objection.
41Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, 208.
42Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, 208–209.
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so lucky, then only one divine person would have created this particular 
world. But this goes against orthodox desiderata.) It seems possible for 
there to be a lack of agreement between the divine persons because none 
of them could offer overriding reasons that they should create this world 
as opposed to any other better possible world. Moreover, in the possible 
world that I indicated above, the persons defer to the other and yet fail to 
agree. Appealing to the divine persons’ wisdom and goodness does not 
offer a specific enough explanation to show that lack of agreement—even 
lack of agreement between perfectly good and wise divine persons—is not 
even remotely possible between the divine persons. Even more, Hasker 
concedes that the divine persons might have to negotiate on what to will 
in order to come to “a mutually satisfactory solution.” In other words, he 
seems to concede that it is possible for the divine persons to lack agree-
ment in what they think and prefer and are obligated to strive to come to 
agree on what to will if they are going to will anything regarding permis-
sible alternatives. But as Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus would have 
replied, this does not sound like a perfect divine will but rather an imper-
fect divine will.
Hasker claims that lack of agreement is possible between the divine 
persons even on Brian Leftow’s non-social model of the Trinity. For Leftow, 
God lives three simultaneous, necessary, and eternal, but non-overlapping 
streams of consciousness.43 God’s living one stream of consciousness is 
God the Father; God’s living another stream of consciousness is God the 
Son; and God’s living another stream of consciousness is God the Holy 
Spirit.44 Hasker observes, “There does not seem to be anything contradic-
tory in the supposition that the one person, God, should have different 
preferences in his different life-streams.”45 Suppose in one stream of God’s 
conscious life that God affirms that the Earth should revolve around the 
sun in one direction, and in another stream of God’s conscious life that 
God affirms that the Earth should revolve around the sun in a different 
direction. What explanation might be given to show that such a lack of 
agreement is not even remotely possible? There seems to be none. Hasker 
takes this to be reason to believe that Leftow’s non-social model is no better 
off than his own social model in securing NA with regard to permissible 
alternatives.
While Hasker is right to object to Leftow’s non-social model on the 
grounds that it too cannot secure NA, what Hasker overlooks is a common 
cause for not securing NA in his own social model, in Swinburne’s so-
cial model, and in Leftow’s non-social model. The insufficient support of 
NA derives from the assumption that a divine person is like a “modern 
43I discuss Leftow’s model of the Trinity in “Indexicals and the Trinity,” 83–84, 90–92. 
There I point out that Leftow seems to use two concepts of personhood, a Boethian concept 
and a Lockean concept.
44Leftow, “Modes without Modalism,” 373–375.
45Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, 214.
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person” or like a Lockean person in the sense that a divine person is 
(partially) constituted by incommunicable intellectual acts and incom-
municable volitional acts. (I include “[partially]” because Swinburne and 
Hasker hold that a person also requires a distinct [and incommunicable] 
intellectual power[s] and volitional power[s].) If a model of the Trinity 
has this assumption, then it is a modern-personhood model, even if this 
genus is divided into social models in which there are numerically distinct 
rational powers and into a non-social model in which there is just one 
set of rational powers. If the divine persons do not share numerically the 
same use of a mental token and numerically the same act of willing (or re-
jecting or niling) what is thought in using a mental token, then the divine 
persons can lack agreement in what they think, affirm, and will. It does 
not matter whether one posits a social Trinity with modern persons (as 
with Swinburne and Hasker) or a non-social Trinity with Locke-persons 
(as with Leftow). Given this assumption and the metaphysical possibility 
of permissible alternatives, it follows that it is at least remotely possible 
that the divine persons can lack agreement with regard to permissible 
alternatives; consequently, NA is not secured.
But suppose that Swinburne and Hasker were right that divine persons 
always agree regarding permissible alternatives because of some stipu-
lated and agreed upon moral guideline that derives from perfect divine 
goodness, omniscience, and omnipotence. By comparing the models, it 
is clear that the Latin Social model is simpler in explanatory economy be-
cause it does not need the additional posit of a voluntarily agreed upon 
moral guideline in order to secure NA. (Nor does the Latin Social model 
need the additional explanatory posit of a mechanism that randomly 
assigns the divine persons’ allocated authority over a given sphere.) On 
the Latin Social model, the divine persons do not need to negotiate, nor 
can they negotiate, between each other on what to will. Lastly, the Latin 
Social model posits fewer divine intellectual powers and volitional powers 
than the social models discussed here and nonetheless explains the way 
in which the divine persons can think different propositions and will dif-
ferent propositions. Although the Latin Social model requires a distinction 
between divine mental tokens and propositions (that are thought and 
willed), it remains overall simpler in explanatory economy than these 
modern-personhood models in trying to secure NA; and it secures NA.
In many respects this Latin Social model of the Trinity is traditional. 
It holds that there is just one divine nature that grounds the divine intel-
lectual and volitional powers. It holds that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit 
are distinct persons by virtue of some incommunicable properties, namely 
begetting, being begotten, being spirated, respectively. It holds the traditional 
distinction between incommunicable notional acts and communicable 
essential acts of intellect and will. Where this model distinguishes itself 
is in its employment of a contemporary externalist understanding of the 
indexical “I” and its analysis of the ambiguous copula that can express 
the “is” of essential numerical sameness without identity. Lastly, it is a 
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development of Henry of Ghent’s and Duns Scotus’s models of the Trinity. 
I take it that these add-ons are improved articulations of the sorts of in-
sights we find in theologians like Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzus, 
Richard of St. Victor, Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus.
University of North Carolina, Asheville
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